Reinvesting Semiconductor Profits into Healthcare

ROTATION STRATEGY · FULL · 2026.06.17

Taking profits from semiconductors

and reinvesting them into healthcare

Semiconductor Profit-Taking × Shifting to Healthcare — An Integrated Strategy

SK Hynix 000660 · Samsung Electronics 005930  |  Yuhan 000100 · Alteogen 196170 · Samsung Biologics 207940 · Curocell 372320

Maintain the supercycle, but trim a portion to reinvest in healthcare opportunities overlooked by the consensus

June 17, 2026 · Goguma Team multi-round cross-discussion + reader valuation + fact-checking synthesis
Semiconductor profit-taking levels · The truth about rotation · 3 unique findings · Target prices for 4 healthcare stocks · Execution plan

Onion (Multiples/Macro) · Acorn (Fundamentals) · Peanut (Risk) · Carrot (Chart/Flow) · Sweet Potato (Comprehensive)

Prologue

At the peak, we ask what to trim and what to add

When a leading stock hits an all-time high, the question to ask is not 'how much higher will it go?' but 'where should I move a portion of these gains?' The semiconductor memory supercycle remains strong—but the 'speed' of price appreciation is past its peak, and capital has already begun probing for its next destination.

This report does not suggest 'selling everything and switching.' Quite the opposite — It deals with a balanced strategy: maintaining the core (key holdings) of the supercycle while gradually trimming a portion of the gains to reinvest in catalytic healthcare stocks that have been neglected. Two numbers form the framework. At 'what price levels' should we trim semiconductors, and into 'which healthcare stocks/at what prices' should we reinvest those funds?

And we established one more principle — Do not copy brokerage target prices. If you buy based solely on target prices, you cannot beat the market average. Significant returns come from seeing the gaps that the consensus has yet to spot—miscalculated figures, misunderstood schedules, and overlooked undervalued assets. Therefore, the target prices for the four healthcare stocks are based on valuations independently calculated by the Goguma Team, using analyst consensus only as a 'reference.' That is the core of this report.

Chapter 1

Semiconductors — The supercycle is alive, but the momentum is slowing

Starting with the conclusion: The memory supercycle is valid until 2027. However, the 'speed' of price increases has passed its peak—so the answer is 'maintain core + gradual profit-taking,' not 'sell everything.'

There is a clear logic behind the Goguma Team’s decision to opt for 'core maintenance + gradual profit-taking (trimming)' rather than a full exit. At the current price of 2,521,000 KRW for SK Hynix, this is not the time to dump shares out of fear of a crash; rather, it is a time to take some profits while riding the upward trend. The point is that this cycle is not over, only the 'speed' is becoming more moderate. SK Hynix has already sold out its 2026 HBM (High Bandwidth Memory) capacity—the high-performance DRAM used in AI accelerators—and confirmed in its conference call that customer demand for the next three years will far exceed its production capacity. Its monopolistic position is also solid, with talk of it securing a 70% share in HBM4 for Nvidia's next-generation 'Rubin' platform.

Why 'planned trimming' instead of panic?

'Carrot' begins with valuation. SK Hynix’s 12-month forward P/E (price-to-earnings ratio) is only about 5.2x. For a large-cap semiconductor stock, where 10x is typically considered normal, this is half the standard, allowing for the interpretation that it is an 'undervalued segment where earnings are exploding but the stock price hasn't kept pace.' In fact, SK Hynix's HBM revenue is expected to jump 3.2x in 2026, operating profit 6.3x, and even general-purpose DRAM, which was a drag for a while, is expected to grow by +109%. DRAM contract prices have surged, with +90–95% growth in Q1 and +58–63% in Q2 compared to the previous quarters. The team is in agreement that a full sell-off, abandoning these fundamentals, cannot be justified by any metric—theme, performance, or monopoly.

Current price is above average consensus, below optimistic target

'Peanut' finds the basis for trimming levels in the distribution of target prices. Brokerage target prices range from 3,800,000 KRW (Shinhan, Mirae Asset) and 3,200,000 KRW (Eugene) to 1,900,000 KRW (Kiwoom, BNK), with an average of 2,294,400 KRW. The current price of 2,521,000 KRW has already crossed this average but is well below the optimistic targets. 'Onion' takes this a step further—viewing the analyst target prices themselves as conservative, effectively acting as a 'floor' because they haven't kept up with the supercycle's speed. Combining these, we will conduct trimming gradually at the levels below, while keeping at least 60% of the core position until the end.

Semiconductor Profit-Taking (Trimming) Levels Trimming

Stock (Current Price)	1st Trim	Additional Trim	Core Principle
SK Hynix 2,521,000 KRW	2,900,000–3,100,000 KRW	3,400,000 KRW+	Trim only a portion in the range exceeding average consensus and heading toward optimistic targets. Maintain 60%+ core
Samsung Electronics 346,500 KRW	380,000–400,000 KRW	450,000 KRW+	Relatively undervalued → Lagging trim(Hold more than Hynix). Refer to KB target of 360,000

It is not a full sell-off. It is a 'lagging trim' strategy where we address the more depressed side (Samsung Electronics) later, even within the same cycle.

There are separate warning signs

'Acorn' separates the 'real triggers' for trimming. While the supercycle itself is valid until 2027, there are three warning signs: the point when the supply increase from Samsung's new P5 fab (41.5 trillion KRW investment) hits production in 2028, the first signs of HBM demand slowing, and a deceleration in the rate of DRAM contract price increases. Until these signals light up, it is rational to take profits little by little while holding onto the core.

Chapter 2

Capital is already rotating — but it's not 'just' healthcare

While semiconductors were attracting attention at all-time highs, capital began to probe neglected growth sectors. Healthcare is one branch of that dispersion—'one branch,' not 'everything.'

In late April 2026, the South Korean stock market was captured in a single scene. Foreigners net sold approximately 2 trillion KRW from the KOSPI, focusing their selling on the two semiconductor giants, Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, while simultaneously buying approximately 700 billion KRW of KOSDAQ stocks. As a result, the KOSDAQ index reclaimed the 1200 level for the first time in 26 years since the dot-com bubble peak in August 2000. The biggest gainers in this spot were healthcare themes. Bio and medical-related theme indices swept the top 1st and 2nd spots in growth rates, and the intuitive narrative that 'money pulled out of semiconductors went into healthcare' dominated the market.

However, in the Goguma Team's view, this linear causality is only half true. Looking at the top buying targets for the foreign selling funds during the same period, alongside healthcare were LS Cable & System in cables, Doosan Robotics in robotics, and Hyundai E&C in AI infrastructure (power/data center construction). In other words, the accurate picture is not 'Semiconductors → Healthcare,' but **'Semiconductor profit-taking → dispersion into previously neglected growth sectors'**and healthcare is just the most visible of several branches. The fact that cables, robots, and power infrastructure were bought together shows that the essence of this rotation (the movement of funds between sectors) is aimed at 'the overall neglected real-asset/growth themes of the AI era.'

The reason healthcare led among them is due to three drivers. First is the GLP-1 (obesity/diabetes treatment class mimicking appetite-suppressing/blood-sugar-regulating hormones) supercycle; this market is projected to grow at an average of around 20% annually through 2030, with the frontier expanding beyond injectables to oral and long-acting drugs. Second is the global technology export momentum of K-Bio. Third is the duration premium, which increases the present value of distant future cash flows during interest rate cut cycles, supporting growth stock valuations.

The shadow of concentration — selection, not beta

However, this rise comes with a dangerous caveat. Even on the day the index hit an all-time high, the number of stocks that actually rose was less than 10% of the total. This means it was an extreme concentration where a tiny number of leading stocks pulled the index up. Furthermore, technology export, the growth engine of Korean bio, is a double-edged sword. There is a growing history of rights being returned following big pharma's pipeline restructuring. As clinical failure and return risks are pervasive across the sector, the Goguma Team's conclusion is clear — the time to buy healthcare as sector beta (trading by riding the entire index) has passed, and now is the phase of stock selectionwhere one must scrutinize clinical data and the quality of partnerships. Money is already rotating, but narrowing the reading of those currents to healthcare alone is a misreading.

Chapter 3

Our own findings — Three things analysts missed

The clues for excess returns are always in the 'gaps of the consensus.' The moments when the market looks at the same stock but assigns different values usually occur when everyone shares the same assumptions.

① Alteogen — Royalty is 'fixed at 2%' not 4.5%

The market has built valuations by assuming royalties for Keytruda SC (subcutaneous), which was licensed to Merck (MSD), at around 4.5% of net sales. However, the actual figure confirmed in the January disclosure was 'fixed at 2%'. A more decisive trap is that royalties do not come in immediately — royalties are 0 KRW until cumulative sales exceed approximately 1 billion USD, so even though 58 billion KRW worth was sold in the first 4 months of launch, the royalties actually in hand were essentially zero. Full-scale royalty recognition will only begin in 2027. While the total milestone amount received by Merck and the patent protection lasting until early 2043 are certainly assets, the team believes it is close to a bubble to pull this into the present as 'realized cash' to claim an NPV of 7–10 trillion KRW and a target price of 600,000 KRW.

② Curocell — July 8 is 'Cancer Committee reimbursement review,' not 'approval'

There is a misunderstanding in the market story that 'Curocell failed to launch in September, re-challenging in July.' Anbal-cel (product name Limcato) already received formal product approval under the Advanced Regenerative Bio Act on April 29. As the first domestic CAR-T (Chimeric Antigen Receptor T-cell) therapy targeting CD19, it proved a complete remission rate of 67%. Therefore, the reality of July 8 is not approval, but a re-submission to the Severe Cancer Disease Deliberation Committee (Amjilsim) for health insurance coverage. The reason for the lack of reimbursement criteria in the 1st review in May was not the drug efficacy itself, but a procedural requirement of 'insufficient publication record in international journals,' and this weakness was resolved as the June clinical results were published in Blood, the most authoritative journal in hematology. The real stock price trigger is not July 8 itself, but the subsequent 'reimbursement notification'.

③ Samsung Biologics — Fundamentals are core, but supply and demand are the worst

Samsung Biologics’ fundamentals are the strongest among the four stocks. However, the supply and demand are the heaviest — in the midst of a massive foreign net selling market, it is a structure where only individuals are supporting the buying while foreigners and institutions are net selling together, so even if the fundamentals are good, the short-term stock price is bound to be heavy. A good company and a good stock are different issues.

Implications of the three findings. ① Alteogen has the strongest supply/demand but valuation expectations should be lowered, ② Curocell needs to re-evaluate the schedule as 'reimbursement notification,' and ③ Samsung Biologics must endure the time gap between fundamentals and supply/demand. These three are where our target prices diverge from the consensus.

Chapter 4

4 Healthcare stocks independent valuation — Bear·Base·Bull

Below are the target prices set by the Goguma Team, not the consensus. For each stock, we calculated the peak sales, multiplied by the multiple, and adjusted for royalty ratios to build the valuation. All four stocks are facing 'events that will soon be confirmed by numbers,' so the gap between Bear, Base, and Bull is wide.

① Yuhan (000100) — Currently 79,100 KRW 1 Hidden #1

The core is a Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) approach, viewing the global peak sales of the non-small cell lung cancer drug Leclaza (US/Europe product name Lazcluze) at approximately 4 billion USD, multiplying by the royalty rate, converting to Net Present Value (NPV), and then separately adding the core pharmaceutical business. Partner J&J (Johnson & Johnson) stated that Q1 2026 combined sales of Leclaza and Rybrevant jumped more than 80% year-on-year, and with the receipt of a 30 million USD European commercialization milestone, cumulative receipts passed 300 million USD out of a total 950 million USD agreement. The fact that foreigners and BlackRock have been accumulating at the bottom while the stock price remained in a neglected section just above the 52-week low (-42% from the high) is also grounds for asymmetrical upside.

Scenario	Target Price	Rationale
Bear	70,000 KRW -11%	Stagnation of core business (generic drug price cuts) + lack of pipelines other than Leclaza
Base	110,000 KRW +39%	Leclaza global growth + remaining milestones + stable core business (SOTP)
Bull	160,000 KRW +102%	Leclaza peak $4B × Royalty NPV fully reflected + follow-up pipeline options

② Alteogen (196170) — Current price 373,000 KRW 2 Strongest supply/demand, valuation pressure

The essence is the ALT-B4 platform, which converts intravenous injections into subcutaneous injections. The team set a conservative multiple because we learned that the Keytruda SC royalty was fixed at 2%, not the market expectation of 5%. However, this 2% royalty is a long-term cash flow that will flow for about 18 years from its full commencement in 2027 until the patent expires in 2043. With raw material supply and ADC subcutaneous injection options added to cumulative contracts with 7 partners including GSK and Biogen, the supply/demand is the most solid, with simultaneous buying from foreigners and institutions. A repeat of last year's frenzy is in the realm of the Bull, predicated on new ADC deals.

Scenario	Target Price	Rationale
Bear	280,000 KRW -25%	2% Royalty, $1B total assumption → Relief of pre-reflected expectations
Base	440,000 KRW +18%	7 partner contracts + raw material supply + 2027 royalty commencement visibility
Bull	550,000 KRW +47%	New ADC-SC big deal + royalty ramp-up. Re-challenging near all-time highs

③ Samsung Biologics (207940) — Current price 1,370,000 KRW 3 Earnings core, patience

The team applied an EV/EBITDA multiple of 21x. This is a midpoint between the 16x of global leader Lonza and the 23x of Celltrion. The ramp-up of Plant 5, an order backlog grown to 6.8 trillion KRW per year, the benefits of the U.S. Biosecure Act which excludes Chinese contract manufacturing, and the U.S. base support the Base scenario. However, we acknowledge short-term resistance at 1.45-1.65 million KRW as foreigners and institutions are net sellers.

Scenario	Target Price	Rationale
Bear	1,200,000 KRW -12%	High exchange rate, capacity gap (2-3 year ramp-up), multiple normalization
Base	1,750,000 KRW +28%	EV/EBITDA 21x + Plant 5 operation & Biosecure Act benefits
Bull	2,350,000 KRW +72%	U.S. base & Plant 6 EBITDA full reflection + foreign net buying turn

④ Curocell (372320) — Current price 34,100 KRW 4 High-risk asymmetric event

Korea's first CAR-T, Anbal-cel (Rimcato), received formal approval in April, and the goal is reimbursement launch. The core value is the peak domestic revenue of approximately 140 billion KRW for relapsed/refractory LBCL (Large B-cell Lymphoma) multiplied by the probability of success; the first revenue upon reimbursement listing is the trigger for the stock price. SLE (Lupus) and solid tumor pipelines are free options added on top.

Scenario	Target Price	Rationale
Bear	25,000 KRW -27%	Reimbursement review difficulties, drug price negotiation failure → Failure to form market without reimbursement
Base	50,000 KRW +47%	Reimbursement listing → First revenue. Peak approx. 140B KRW × success probability
Bull	90,000 KRW +164%	Reimbursement + SLE/solid tumor pipeline option realization

Chapter Five

Curocell — Not a 'failure', but a watershed called reimbursement

In the spring of 2026, when the market wrote about Curocell as "reimbursement failure," that term contained only half the truth.

The conclusion reached by the Cancer Disease Deliberation Committee on May 27th regarding Rimcato (ingredient name: Anbal-cel) was not a rejection, but a 'failure to set reimbursement criteria.' The crux is that it wasn't a doubt about efficacy or safety, but a procedural requirement—that the overseas peer-reviewed journal article supporting the clinical results had not yet been formally published—that held it back. Rimcato received formal product approval on April 29th as the first domestic CAR-T (an anticancer immune cell therapy that extracts patient immune cells, genetically engineers them to find cancer cells, and re-injects them), and the clinical report of a 67% complete remission rate is a fact already recognized by regulatory authorities. It is a situation of "the factory is fully built, but one document for the completion inspection is late."

July 8th, when procedural requirements are resolved

That one document has been resolved. With the clinical result paper for Curocell accepted for publication in 'Blood,' the highest authority journal in the field of hematology, the justification for the 'failure to set' has disappeared. Based on this, the company is pushing for a re-submission to the Cancer Disease Deliberation Committee on July 8th. However, passing the committee does not mean an immediate launch. Following that, stages such as the Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Evaluation Committee review, drug price negotiations with the National Health Insurance Service, resolution by the Health Insurance Policy Deliberation Committee, and Ministry of Health and Welfare notification remain. Given the nature of ultra-high-priced new drugs, a Risk Sharing Agreement (RSA, a system where the pharmaceutical company refunds part of the drug price if ineffective) is highly likely to be applied, and depending on the intensity of negotiations, the original September launch target may be pushed back to year-end, or in some cases, early next year.

July 8th is not a 'fixed date' — 5 steps to reimbursement listing

We must correct the most common misunderstanding here. July 8th is not the day 'reimbursement is confirmed,' but the day that determines whether it passes the first hurdle (Cancer Disease Deliberation Committee) out of five steps toward reimbursement. The actual 'reimbursement notification (confirmation/application)' must go through four more steps: Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Evaluation Committee → Drug Price Negotiation → Health Insurance Policy Deliberation Committee → Ministry of Health and Welfare notification.

Step	Content	Timing
1. Cancer Disease Deliberation Committee (Severe Cancer Disease Deliberation Committee)	Setting reimbursement criteria — Re-challenge for the May non-setting	July 8th ← First hurdle
2. Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Evaluation Committee (Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Evaluation Committee)	Reimbursement appropriateness/cost-effectiveness evaluation	After 7/8 passage
3. Drug Price Negotiation	Drug price with NHIS + Risk Sharing Agreement (RSA, refund part of price if ineffective) Negotiation (max 60 days)	Biggest variable
4. Health Insurance Policy Deliberation Committee (Health Insurance Policy Deliberation Committee)	Final resolution	After agreement reached
5. MOHW Notification	= Real 'reimbursement confirmation/application' → launch/first revenue	Company goal Within the year

Summary — 7/8 is a 'turning point', reimbursement confirmation is 4Q at the earliest. The July 8th committee meeting is the first hurdle of 'can we go to reimbursement', and the final reimbursement notification must pass through the Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Evaluation Committee, drug price negotiations, Health Insurance Policy Deliberation Committee, and notification afterwards. The company's launch target has already been adjusted from the original September to 'within the year' — a September launch is practically off the table. The longest and most uncertain step is the RSA (risk sharing) drug price negotiation due to the nature of ultra-high-priced CAR-T. Therefore, passing on 7/8 is the '1st momentum' (passing the first hurdle), and the actual first revenue and full re-evaluation will come after the final notification.

Why reimbursement is the ON/OFF switch for revenue

The reason Curocell investment judgment is difficult is that it is not a structure where the revenue curve rises gently, but a digital structure where 0 and tens of billions of KRW depend on a single switch called reimbursement. As the drug price of the competitor Kymriah reaches about 360 million KRW, it is practically impossible for patients to afford Rimcato out-of-pocket without reimbursement. Conversely, once reimbursement is cleared, the speed competitiveness of 14 days for manufacturing (compared to 40 days for Kymriah) and the accessibility of being a domestic product will immediately convert to revenue. The revenue forecasts of 114.1 billion KRW in 2026 and 150.8 billion KRW in 2027 presented by the company should be viewed with a conservative discount, but the direction is clear. Moreover, with over 80 billion KRW in cash, it has the ammunition to run follow-up pipelines such as SLE (Systemic Lupus Erythematosus) CAR-T and solid tumor CAR-T.

High-risk event, so small, incremental amounts. As the essence is a high-risk bet dependent on a single event, the discipline of confirming results on July 8th with small, incremental amounts rather than a full bet must be a prerequisite. Bear 25,000 KRW reflects rejection/negotiation difficulties, Base 50,000 KRW reflects year-end reimbursement/launch, and Bull 90,000 KRW reflects a picture where SLE momentum is added to rapid reimbursement.

Chapter Six

Execution Plan — Where to trim, where to plant first

The first step of this execution plan is 'diversification', not 'replacement'. The point is not to take out all the valuation gains created by memory and switch entirely, but to trim some and scatter them into four healthcare stocks in order of risk/reward (R/R).

We maintain the principle of holding more than 60% of the semiconductor core (core holdings) until the end, and only add trims on top of that. For SK Hynix, we trim the weight at 2.9~3.1 million KRW first, and additionally at 3.4 million KRW or more, but maintain over 60% as core. For Samsung Electronics, the trim line is 380k~400k KRW first, and an additional 450k KRW or more; based on the judgment that it is relatively more undervalued than SK Hynix even in the same memory sector, we delay the trim more than SK Hynix — so-called trailing trim.

Four healthcare stocks planted in R/R order

The funds secured this way go into the R/R order, which multiplies fundamentals, supply/demand, and safety margins. The top priority is Yuhan Corporation. This is also the point that diverges most from the market consensus, and the very pessimism that caused some securities firms to lower their target prices due to lower-than-expected Leclaza royalties paradoxically creates an asymmetric opportunity. We buy incrementally when pressed by short-term royalty noise and fill it up significantly as a core. The 2nd priority, Alteogen, has the strongest fundamentals and supply/demand, but valuation pressure is high, so we refrain from chasing and only buy on dips. 3rd priority Samsung Biologics is an earnings core, and we scale in while confirming the turn in foreign supply/demand. 4th priority Curocell redefines the schedule, so we only hold a small amount, add after confirming reimbursement notification, and cut losses if rejected.

Healthcare buying priority Diversified planting

Priority	Stock	Base potential	Character	Execution
1	Yuhan Corporation	+39% (Bull +102%)	Undervalued/Asymmetric	Incremental buying at 75,000~80,000. Large amount as core
2	Alteogen	+18% (Bull +47%)	Strong supply/demand, valuation pressure	Buy on dips at 360,000~380,000. Refrain from chasing
3	Samsung Biologics	+28% (Bull +72%)	Earnings core	Incremental at 1,250,000~1,350,000. Confirm foreign turn
4	Curocell	+47% (Bull +164%)	High-risk event	Small amount only. Add after confirming reimbursement, cut if rejected

**How is it different from consensus?**When the market cheered for Alteogen, we saw the '2% royalty trap' and lowered our expectations; we raised 'Yuhan's asymmetry', which the market ignored, to 1st priority; and we redefined Curocell's schedule not as 'July' but as 'reimbursement notification'. These three diverging judgments from the consensus — lowering Alteogen expectations, upgrading Yuhan to 1st priority, and redesigning the Curocell schedule — are the basis for excess returns.

The core of execution. It is 'diversification', not 'replacement'. Keep the semiconductor core (do not sell everything), trim only a portion in the target price range, and plant those funds into different types of healthcare stocks. Core is large in 'Yuhan + Samsung Bio', Alteogen is on dips, and Curocell is small as an event bet. Incremental over chasing, and add only after confirming events is the discipline.

Chapter Seven

Signs that the story is going off-track

A strategy is not finished once it's set; it's more like a steering wheel that needs to be pressed or pulled back based on market signals at every moment. We define acceleration signals and reversal signals in advance and calmly watch to see if they light up.

Category	Acceleration signal (Press)	Reversal signal (Pull back)
Semiconductor	Contract price slowdown, extreme concentration, target price reached → Trim	HBM demand re-acceleration, new large orders → Hold trim
Rotation	Foreign net buying in KOSDAQ continues, healthcare theme strength	Foreign re-entry into semiconductors, KOSDAQ gives back 1200
Yuhan Corporation	Leclaza revenue acceleration, milestone receipt	Core business drug price reduction, competitor drug arrival
Alteogen	New ADC-SC deal, 2027 royalty commencement	Royalty further delay, valuation burden realization
Samsung Biologics	Foreign net buying turn, new orders	High exchange rate, capacity gap
Curocell	Reimbursement notification passage·Drug price negotiation smooth sailing	Reimbursement re-review difficulty, cash depletion

In closing. The peak of a supercycle is not the end but the beginning of a question — what to keep, what to trim, and where to replant. Semiconductors are still strong, so keep them as core, but since the concentration at all-time highs is burdensome, trim some in the target price range. That funding is based on our own judgment that sees the gaps the consensus hasn't corrected yet — Alteogen royalty rate, Curocell schedule, Samsung Bio supply/demand — prioritizing the asymmetry of undervaluation (Yuhan), keeping the solidity of earnings (Samsung Bio) as core, and planting asymmetric events (Curocell) in small amounts. Diversification is not all at once but incrementally, and events are confirmed, not guessed — that is our team's discipline for seeking excess returns.

This report is an integrated strategy document that synthesizes the multiple cross-discussions of the Goguma team (Onion, Acorn, Peanut, Carrot, Sweet Potato) and reader valuation/fact-checking.
The suggested target prices and price ranges are the Goguma team's own estimation scenarios, not securities firm consensus, and are not investment recommendations. Investment judgment and responsibility lie with the investor themselves.
As of the closing price on June 17, 2026 · SK Hynix (000660) · Samsung Electronics (005930) · Yuhan Corporation (000100) · Alteogen (196170) · Samsung Biologics (207940) · Curocell (372320)